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Abstract
This paper ￿rst presents stylised evidence showing how the date of the introduction of
competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt compet-
tion policy later. We thereafter present a simple theoretical model with countries of di⁄erent
size and ￿rms competing ￿ la Cournot. The predictions of the model are consistent with
the empirical regularity presented. An implication of our model is that globalisation may
give very di⁄erent incentives regarding competition policy for small and large developing
countries.
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1 Introduction
Competition policy is by now prevalent and important in most industrialised countries, and
is being adopted in developing countries and in recent market economies (see Basedow, 2004).
An interesting example is the ￿Draft Anti-Monopoly Law￿that has been submitted to China￿ s
State Council (Mason & Hou Jiangxiao, 2004). It is notable that anti-trust legislation has been
introduced at very di⁄erent points in time in countries at similar levels of industrialisation.
The US passed its ￿rst anti-trust law as early as 1890, and other countries followed during
the 20th century, although with signi￿cant lags. For instance, the ￿rst British competition
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1law was passed in 1948, and France and Germany followed in 1953 and 1957 (see Neumann,
2001). A number of countries, like Italy, New Zealand and Switzerland, did not adopt national
competition laws until the 1980s and 1990s.
The question we ask in this paper is why countries at roughly the same levels of industrial
development may ￿nd it in their interest to introduce national anti-trust regulations at di⁄erent
points in time. The hypothesis investigated is that this may derive from the simple fact that
countries di⁄er in size, and that they are therefore a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways by the increased
international trade that follows from reduced trade costs. The paper presents a simple Cournot
model showing how globalisation will induce countries of di⁄erent size to introduce competition
policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with stylised facts presented.
There are a number of studies on competition policy in open economies. One strand of
the literature focuses on issues related to harmonisation and decentralisation. For example,
Barros & Cabral (1994) extends the analysis of Farrell & Shapiro (1990) by discussing optimal
merger policies for open economies, assuming homogenous products and Cournot competition.
Obviously, in open economies competition authorities ignore the e⁄ects of domestic mergers on
foreign ￿rms and consumers. Conditions are provided under which decentralised competition
policy is as e¢ cient as centralised competition policy. Head & Ries (2001) study the relationship
between national and supra-national merger regulations in a Cournot framework. They conclude
that in the absence of cost savings it will be in the national interest of competition authorities
to block most mergers that reduce global welfare. This will not be the case however when the
merger is associated with substantial cost savings.1
A number of papers aim at explaining the connection between optimal trade policy and
various market characteristics. For example, Eaton & Grossman (1986) studies how optimal
policy, in terms of taxes and subsidies, depends on the choice of strategic variable, prices or
1Bond (1997) has a similar objective as Head & Ries (2001). Centralised and decentralised competition author-
ities are compared within a customs union framework, where ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot and local governments
maximize weighted social welfare. The model is then applied to the early development of the competition policy
of the US.
2quantities. Export subsidies turn out often to be preferable under Cournot competition, while
a tax tends to be a better policy under Bertrand competition. De Stefano & Rysman (2004)
develop a strategic trade model based on Dixit (1979), with two countries exporting to a third
country. The government chooses a tax policy, as well as the number of exporters and the
number of product varieties produced. The main ￿nding is that governments will always choose
to group all products within a single ￿rm, which seems intuitive considering that consumer
welfare issues are disregarded. Both quantity setting ￿rms and price setting ￿rms are considered.
There are two studies that are closely related to our work, Dixit (1984) and Horn & Levin-
sohn (2001). Both analyse (among other things) the strategic e⁄ect of an increase in the number
of ￿rms in Cournot markets. In Dixit (1984) the point of departure is the view that foreign
competition might make domestic competition policy redundant and that domestic mergers
could become desirable from a social perspective. In a model with fragmented markets and
zero trade costs and tari⁄s he ￿nds that home country welfare decreases in the number of home
country ￿rms when imports are small relative to exports. Horn & Levinsohn (2001) discusses
under what circumstances trade liberalisation will induce countries to use competition policy
in a ￿beggar-thy-neighbour￿fashion. The model is symmetric with two countries, homogenous
products, segmented markets and zero trade costs. The governments choose the number of do-
mestic ￿rms as well as the levels of import and export subsidies/taxes. No clear-cut relationship
between the levels of taxes/subsidies and optimal market structures is found.2
Our study considers national competition policies, but ignores issues related to harmonisa-
tion. In terms of methodology, we consider the case of Cournot competition with homogenous
goods, and in this respect our study resembles previous studies. However, the time of intro-
duction of competition policy in combination with asymmetries in country size is important in
the question we ask. We analyse this by considering the e⁄ect of exogenous trade costs (e.g.
2A somewhat similar analysis, extended with a discussion of customs unions, is found in Richardson (1999).
However, the focus in Richardson (1999) is on tari⁄s, while Horn & Levinsohn (2001) consider a more general
class of policies.
3transportation costs) that decrease over time, on countries of di⁄erent size.3 Thus we di⁄er
from the existing literature by focusing on the relation between optimal competition policy,
country size and trade costs.
The paper is organised as follows. First, some stylised facts are presented. We then develop
an oligopolistic trade model with trade costs and derive our main results. The ￿nal section
concludes and discusses the policy implications of the results.
2 Stylised facts
The US introduced anti-trust legislation at a very early stage with the Sherman Act against
monopolisation in 1890, and developed its policies with several other laws: the Clayton Act,
which prohibits certain marketing practises and restricts mergers, and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, both in 1914. In contrast, a country like Sweden had virtually no competition
law before 1993; the precursor to its present competition authority, the Swedish National Price
and Cartel Board, counted as one of its tasks the public registration of cartels, which were in
practice legal (see F￿lster & Peltzman, 1993).
A very basic di⁄erence between these two countries lies in the size of their respective markets.
The question then arises whether these observations of a large country introducing competition
policy earlier than a small country are indications of a more general pattern. To investigate
this we compiled data on the year of the ￿rst competition law for the 24 ￿high-income￿OECD
countries, i.e., not including the six entrants since 1994, namely Korea, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Mexico and the Slovak Republic. The latter countries became market
economies at a considerably later stage and would have been less prone to introduce competition
policy before that time. The data on the year of introduction of competition policy is described
in the Appendix. The year used is the year when an anti-trust law or competition law was
introduced, even if enforcement of the law was very limited. The median year for the ￿rst anti-
3Baldwin et al. (2001) present some direct evidence of falling transportation and communication costs.
Increasing trade shares also constitute strong indirect evidence. See e.g. O￿ Rouke and Williamson (1999).
4Figure 1: Year of ￿rst competition law and GDP in 1970 for 24 OECD countries
trust law among these countries is 1966. Figure 1 plots year of ￿rst competition law against
GDP in 1970 for these countries.
A simple OLS regression of ￿Year of ￿rst competition policy￿on ￿GDP in 1970￿yields a
signi￿cant and negative estimate (P-value 0:003). To investigate the robustness of the corre-
lation, the regression was run with a number of broadly descriptive macroeconomic variables
as control variables, and for the years 1970 and 1990. The control variables used are: Export
share in GDP, GDP per capita and Share of government consumption in GDP, all variables for
the same year. Using one particular year for the macroeconomic variables implies that it is the
e⁄ect of each country￿ s relative position that is investigated. In another 1990 regression, 1990b,
data on corruption from the World Bank, and on Gini coe¢ cients from the UN, from around
1990, are also added. None of the control variables is signi￿cant when included together with
GDP. The results are shown in Table 1.4
4If only those countres that passed competition laws after 1945 are considered, the GDP e⁄ect is still signi￿cant,
with a P-value of 0.015 for GDP in 1970.
5Speci￿cation 1970a 1970b 1990a 1990b
GDP -0.026￿￿￿ (0.008) -0.024￿￿ (0.01) -0.017￿￿￿ (0.005) -0.017￿￿￿ (0.005)
Export share -0.123 (0.322) -0.301 (0.279) -0.205 (0.306)
GDP per cap. -0.002 (0.007) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Gov. share. -2.141 (1.591) -2.270 (1.535) -1.217 (1.990)
Corruption -3.057 (3.459)
Gini 0.685 (1.483)
Number of obs. 24 24 24 23
Table 1: OLS regression of Year of ￿rst competition law on GDP and control variables5
The results are very much the same if GDP is replaced with the size of the population (not
shown). The table and the ￿gure show a clear correlation: smaller countries tend to be later in
introducing competition policy. We next turn to a theoretical investigation of the mechanisms
that may cause this.
3 A simple model
3.1 Basics
There are two countries, the home country (H) and the foreign country (F), and four ￿rms.
Firms 1 and 2 are located in H and ￿rms 3 and 4 in F. Firms produce homogenous products
and compete ￿ la Cournot, in both markets. Markets are segmented so each ￿rm chooses two
quantities, one for the domestic market and one for the export market. The countries di⁄er in
size and country j has nj identical inhabitants. The representative consumer in each country
has the utility function
Uj = ￿qj ￿
1
2
(qj)2 + I; (1)
qj being the per capita quantity consumed in country j 2 fH;Fg. Hence, utility is quadratic
in the traded good and linear in a composite good, I, which represents the part of the budget
that is spent on other consumption. Let pj denote the price of the traded good in country j;
5Standard errors in parentheses.
￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 1 per cent level and
￿￿ at the 5 per cent level.
A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity does not reject the hypothesis of constant variance
for any of the regressions. See the Appendix for data sources.
6and let m be the per capita income, which is equal across countries. Then obviously I = m￿
pjqj. Firm i￿ s output in country j￿ s market is given by Q
j






utility maximixation leads to the following demand functions:
pj = ￿ ￿ qj (2)
The production technology is characterised by zero marginal cost but a positive ￿xed pro-
duction cost, denoted by f. In addition, ￿rms incur a per unit trade cost ￿ when exporting.
The objective of the government is to choose the competition policy that maximises domestic
welfare, Wj, as measured by the sum of aggregate utility and domestic pro￿ts.6 Note that these
welfare components can be readily aggregated since the utility function is quasi-linear. Hence,
denoting ￿rm pro￿ts by ￿i, domestic welfare in H equals WH = nHUH +￿1 +￿2 while welfare
in F is de￿ned analogously. Firm i￿ s pro￿t is the sum of pro￿ts earned in the local market and













i ￿ ￿) ￿ f; k 2 f1;2g: (3)













i ) ￿ f; k 2 f3;4g: (4)
It is assumed that synergies in terms of ￿xed costs are such that if two ￿rms collude or merge, the
joint pro￿t of the two colluding ￿rms is always larger that the sum of pro￿ts without collusion.
3.2 Unilateral competition policy
In this section, we will show that large countries have a stronger incentive to start implementing
competition policy than small countries. Hence, we ask under what conditions a country (here
6Most juridictions that apply a merger policy use a consumer welfare standard to evaluate mergers. A notable
exception is Canada. However, when the issue at hand is whether or not a country should impose competition
policy to begin with, we argue that the most relevant welfare measure is aggregate welfare.
7country H) would unilaterally want to start preventing ￿rms from colluding or start impleme-
menting a strict merger policy. The point of departure is a world without competition or merger
policy. We de￿ne competition policy, which is taken to be the same thing as anti-trust policy,
as follows
Definition 1 When a country has a national competition policy, the ￿rms located in the coun-
try will make independent decisions about quantities sold in both the domestic market and the
export market.
For simplicity, we do not explicitly take into account the administrative costs associated with
the implementation of competition policy. We assume that when neither of the countries has a
competition policy, ￿rms 1 and 2 will collude or merge, as will ￿rms 3 and 4. It is assumed that
collusion across borders is not possible. Hence, in this scenario local ￿rms collusively choose
production quantities for the local market as well as for the export market, given the expected
quantites produced by the foreign ￿rms in these markets. Solving for the Nash equilibrium

























which in turn implies that joint pro￿ts equal
￿1 + ￿2 =
nH(￿ + ￿)2 + nF(￿ ￿ 2￿)2
9
￿ ￿f; (9)
8where ￿ < 2 measures the strength of synergies in ￿xed costs. The consumer surplus is




Hence, aggregate welfare becomes
WH =
nH(￿ + ￿)2 + nF(￿ ￿ 2￿)2
9




where pro￿t and consumer surplus are written separately to simplify welfare comparisons below.
The welfare in (11) may be compared to a situation when country H unilaterally introduces





2 are chosen independently from each other. The corresponding Nash equilibrium

























e ￿1 + e ￿2 =
nH(￿ + ￿)2 + nF(￿ ￿ 2￿)2
8
￿ 2f (16)








nH(￿ + ￿)2 + nF(￿ ￿ 2￿)2
8




9Note from (6), (7), (13) and (14) that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for interior




2￿ < ￿ < 1
3￿ the foreign country will not
sell in the domestic market after the home country has adopted a competition policy, and for
￿ ￿ 1
2￿ there is no trade with or without competition policy. We henceforth assume ￿ ￿
_
￿.
Now, under the assumption that F does not adopt a competition policy, de￿ne ￿H as the










￿2 + 2￿￿ ￿ ￿2￿
32
; (19)
where N ￿ nH + nF; and sH ￿ nH
N : The ￿rst two terms of expression (19) measure the
di⁄erence in pro￿ts, and the last term measures the di⁄erence in consumer surplus. This leads
us to Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 Large countries have relatively stronger incentives to adopt a competition pol-
icy.




Proposition 2 The bene￿t of adopting a competition policy is increasing in ￿ for large coun-
tries. Speci￿cally, for a country j, @￿H
@￿ > 0, for all ￿, if sj > 8=17:






(17￿ ￿ 19￿) > 0 for ￿ ￿
_
￿
which implies that @￿H
@￿ increases monotonically in sH: Next, the sH that solves @￿H





The highest value of this expression for ￿ 2 [0; ￿
3] is given by 8
17 for ￿ = 0:
10Since the number of ￿rms is equal and constant in the two countries, the larger the domestic
economy the more important the consumer surplus is in relative terms, which accounts for
Proposition 1. By the same logic the value of competition policy must increase in the absolute
size of the two countries (N). This is con￿rmed by (19).
Proposition 2 deals with the slope of ￿H as trade costs (the level of integration) change.










where the ￿rst term measures the pro￿t e⁄ect and the second term measures the consumer
surplus e⁄ect. The sign of the total e⁄ect turns out to hinge critically on the relative size of the
two countries. Note that the e⁄ect of competition policy on overall pro￿ts is always negative,
due to cost synergies. However, cost synergies do not depend on trade costs and the pro￿t e⁄ect
of competition policy may be increasing or decreasing in ￿. A positive pro￿t e⁄ect implies that
variable pro￿ts increase (i.e., overall pro￿ts become less negative). For large sH we have that
￿H increases in the trade cost, implying that incentives to adopt competition policy are high at
high trade costs, but for small sH the opposite holds and the incentive to adopt a competition
policy will be lower at high trade costs.
To understand the intuition for this result, note ￿rst that the Cournot model is characterised
by a ￿rst mover advantage. Hence, ￿rms that can commit to higher levels of output increase
variable pro￿ts. One way to commit to higher output levels is to operate as two ￿rms instead
of one. In other words, two separate ￿rms earn higher variable pro￿ts than one integrated (i.e.,
merged) ￿rm.7 Moreover, competition policy increases the number of independent ￿rms by the
same fraction in both markets, which means that sales increase by the same fraction in H and
F. The e⁄ect can be seen by comparing (5) with (12) and (7) with (14). Finally, note from (9)
and (16) that variable ￿rm pro￿ts essentially depend on quantities squared. This means that the
7This means that mergers have to be motivated partly by e¢ ciency gains. In this sense our framework is
similar to e.g., Horn & Levinsohn (2001) and and most other studies in the ￿eld. In the absence of such gains
￿rms in Cournot markets would disintegrate into a world of perfect competition.
11variable pro￿t will be convex in relative market shares. That is, a proportional increase in both
quantities will be more valuable the more skewed the distribution of market size. Competition
policy therefore has a stronger positive e⁄ect on variable pro￿ts for producers in a large country
when trade costs are high, since this increases the relative size of the dominant home market.
On the other hand, if H is small, most revenues are captured in the export market. As a
consequence, the relative size of this larger market increases as trade costs are reduced. This
means that for a small country the strategic gain from competition policy is largest at low trade
costs.
In terms of per capita consumer welfare, the utility gain from competition policy is largest
for high trade costs since then the competitive pressure is weak. To conclude, if H is large,
￿rms and consumers will bene￿t most from competition policy, in terms of variable pro￿ts
and aggregate utility, when trade costs are high.8 If H is small, ￿rms will gain most from
competition policy, in terms of variable pro￿ts, when trade costs are low, while consumers will
gain most when they are high. However, if H is small then sH and thus the weight put on
consumer utility is small, so the pro￿t e⁄ect will dominate.
Figure 2 illustrates numerically Propositions 1 and 2 for N = 12; ￿ = 1:5; f = 3; and
￿ = 1:62. The curves show ￿H for home countries of di⁄erent size.
From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that large countries, like the US, are likely to adopt
competition policy when trade costs are high; that is, they are likely to be early adopters. This
is especially so since there may be administrative or other costs involved when implementing
competition policy, implying that ￿H will need to exceed some minimum level before the country
would consider introducing the policy.
The next question is what circumstances make it advantageous for smaller countries to follow
the early example of larger countries.
8Note that we have restricted attention to levels of trade costs such that trade actually occurs. In the less
interesting case where trade was prohibitively costly, mergers to monopoly would of course always be pro￿table.
12Figure 2: Gains from competition policy for di⁄erent sizes of a large country H
3.3 Multilateral competition policy
Given that a large country H has adopted a competition policy, when will a smaller country F
want to do the same? In order to answer this question we ￿rst calculate equilibrium quantities
and welfare measures for the case when both countries have adopted competition policies. Then
we calculate the welfare in F when only H has adopted a competition policy. Finally, the welfare
gains for country F from introducing a competition policy are discussed.
When both countries have a national competition policy, output decisions are made indepen-


























e ￿3 + e ￿4 =
2
￿
nH(￿ ￿ 3￿)2 + nF(￿ + 2￿)2￿
25
￿ 2f (25)
















If, on the other hand, country H adopts a competition policy while ￿rms in F collude the
corresponding Nash equilibrium quantities are given by (12), (13), (14), and (15) and pro￿t and
welfare measures in F are:
￿3 + ￿4 =
nH(￿ ￿ 3￿)2 + nF(￿ + 2￿)2
16
￿ ￿f (28)











Now, under the assumption that H adopts a competition policy, de￿ne ￿F as the di⁄erence

















where sF ￿ nF
N : The ￿rst two terms measure the di⁄erence in pro￿ts and the last term measures
the di⁄erence in consumer surplus. This leads us to Proposition 3.
14Proposition 3 A larger country has stronger incentives to follow the other country and adopt
a competition policy.
Proof : The statement follows from the fact that for ￿ ￿
_
￿, we have that @￿F
@sF > 0.
The intuition is again simply that a large country has more consumers and therefore cares
more about the consumer surplus, which always increases as competition policy is introduced.
Proposition 4 The bene￿t of introducing competition policy, given that the other country has






countries reductions in trade costs will eventually favour the adoption of a competition policy.





the incentives to adopt a competition policy are maximal
for ￿ = 0.
Proof : Note that ￿F is convex in ￿ and that @￿F
@￿ > 0 for ￿ =
_
￿. The ￿rst and second
statements follow from the fact that @￿F
@sF > 0 for all sF if and only if sF > 21
46: The second
statement follows from the fact that ￿F(0) > ￿F(
_
￿) for sF < 63
223.
The interpretation is similar as for Proposition 2. If country F is large relative to the export
market, most pro￿ts are earned in the domestic market, and the total sales of domestic ￿rms
are higher at high trade costs. Competition policy increases the market shares of domestic
￿rms, and this strategic gain is largest at high trade costs. On the other hand, if country F is
small, most revenues are captured in the export market, and domestic ￿rms grow as trade costs
are reduced. This means that the strategic gain from competition policy is largest at small
trade costs. In terms of per capita consumer welfare, the utility gain from competition policy
is largest at large trade costs since then the competitive pressure is weak.
In sum, if country F is large, both ￿rms and consumers will bene￿t most from competition
policy, in terms of variable pro￿ts and aggregate utility, when trade costs are high. If country
F is small its ￿rms will gain most from competition policy, in terms of variable pro￿ts, when
trade costs are low, while its consumers gain most at high trade costs. However, if the home
15Figure 3: Gains from competition policy for di⁄erent sizes of the small country F
country is small the weight put on consumer utility is small so the pro￿t e⁄ect will dominate.
Propositions 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figure 3 for ￿ = 1:5; f = 3;￿ = 1:8 and N = 18: The
curves show ￿F for sF = 0:1 (lowest dotted curve), and 0:25. The ￿gure illustrates how small
countries are likely to wait until economic integration has proceeded far enough before adopting
a national competition policy.
The analysis, thus, shows how large countries are likely to be early adopters of competition
policy, and how small countries may be expected to follow later when integration has proceeded
far enough.
4 Concluding discussion
This paper presents stylised empirical evidence from OECD countries showing how small coun-
tries have historically been late in introducing competition policy. The negative correlation
between the size of countries and the time before introducing competition policy is shown to
be robust to the introduction of a number of control variables. We thereafter analyse a model
with two countries of di⁄erent size separated by trade costs where ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot.
The model illustrates how large countries have the strongest incentives to introduce competition
16policy when trade costs are high, whereas small countries have incentives to follow only once
trade costs have come down. Given that trade costs have fallen over the course of the 20th
century, this is consistent with the observed empirical regularity.
The basic mechanism in the model is that competition policy forces domestic ￿rms to set
quantities independently, and thereby essentially gives them a ￿rst mover advantage compared
to foreign ￿rms. This advantage increases more than proportionally with market size. For
￿rms in a large country the home market is of dominant importance, and since high trade
costs reinforce this dominance they also increase the value of competition policy in terms of
variable pro￿ts. For ￿rms in a small country the foreign market is of dominant importance, and
competition policy is therefore most valuable, in terms of variable pro￿ts, at low trade costs.
Finally, the gain in consumer welfare from competition policy is largest at high trade costs
in any country, since then the competitive pressure is weak. Hence, in a large country both
consumers and ￿rms would prefer to implement competition policy at high trade costs. This
is not the case in small countries. However, since there are few consumers in a small country,
￿rms￿ interests still dominate government policy even though we assume that governments
weight pro￿ts and consumer surplus equally. This also implies that assuming that ￿rms have a
stronger in￿ uence than consumers, e.g. achieved through lobbying (see Grossman & Helpman
(1994)) would probably not alter our results, and a ￿Competition policy for sale￿ -variant of our
model would yield very similar results to the present version. In large countries ￿rms have weak
incentives to lobby against the implementation of competition policy when trade costs are high.
For small countries the opposite relation holds.
Even though this paper attempts to explain the historical pattern of the introduction of
competition policy, it has forward-looking implications. One implication of our model is that
globalisation may give very di⁄erent incentives regarding competition policy for small and large
developing countries. Small countries are likely to favour adoption of competition policy once
they are su¢ ciently integrated in the world trading system. For large countries, such as China
and India, the situation may be di⁄erent. Their incentives to implement competition policy may
17be stronger at an early stage of integration. However, it is also possible that these fast-growing
countries are in transit from being of small or medium relative market size to being large, and
that they were relatively small when trade costs were high and are now becoming relatively
large as trade costs have fallen. In such a case these countries may never ￿nd it in their interest
to implement competition policy.
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205 Appendix
Data sources:
The information on the year of the ￿rst competition law is derived as far as possible from OECD
country reports; these are available for all except Australia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Sweden and Switzerland. For Australia the information is from Steinwall (1999), for Iceland,
Luxembourg and Sweden from the respective competition authority home pages, for Portugal
from Cuatrecasas and Gon￿alves Pereira, Castelo Branco (2004), and for Switzerland from
Neven & Von Ungern-Sternberg (1997).
For each country, the year sought has been the year when the ￿rst law that is identi￿ed as
a competition law or anti-trust law, was passed. The years used are: Australia: 1974, Austria:
1988, Belgium: 1960, Canada: 1889, Denmark: 1955, Finland: 1988, France: 1953, Germany:
1957, Greece: 1977, Iceland: 1993, Ireland: 1953, Italy: 1990, Japan: 1947, Luxembourg: 1970,
Netherlands: 1958, New Zealand: 1986, Norway: 1926, Portugal: 1984, Spain: 1962, Sweden:
1993, Switzerland: 1985, Turkey: 1994, UK: 1948, US: 1890
The data on GDP, Export share in GDP, GDP per capita and Share of government con-
sumption in GDP, is from the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database,
available at unstats.un.org. Gini coe¢ cients (not available for Iceland) are for one year between
1987 and 1995, from the United Nations University WIDER World Income Inequality Database,
available at www.wider.unu.edu. The corruption measure adds up six measures taken from Kau-
mann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2003), of Voice and accountability, Political stability, Government
e⁄ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of corruption, from 1996.
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